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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples:
very small perturbations of the input having a dramatic impact on the predictions.
A wealth of adversarial attacks and distance metrics to quantify the similarity
between natural and adversarial images have been proposed, recently enlarging the
scope of adversarial examples with geometric transformations beyond pixel-wise
attacks. In this context, we investigate the robustness to adversarial attacks of new
Convolutional Neural Network architectures providing equivariance to rotations.
We found that rotation-equivariant networks are significantly less vulnerable to
geometric-based attacks than regular networks on the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and
ImageNet datasets.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning provided significant breakthroughs in machine learning, and Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNNs) are now being used routinely for computer vision tasks. However, theoretical as
well as practical concerns remain, a prime example being adversarial attacks: very small perturba-
tions of the input causing catastrophic changes in the predictions of the network. Since adversarial
examples were first noticed (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015), the vast majority of the
studies has focused on pixel-wise attacks for the L0, L2, or L∞ distance metrics on images (for
a review, see, e.g., Akhtar & Mian (2018)). Very recently the notion of adversarial examples on
images was refined to account for the human perception (Luo et al., 2018), and extended to rigid
geometric transformations (Fawzi & Frossard, 2015; Kanbak et al., 2017; Engstrom et al., 2017) and
local geometric distortions (Xiao et al., 2018).
In an independent effort, several groups strived to extend the symmetry properties of CNNs beyond
equivariance to translations. The most natural next step is to equip the models with invariance or
equivariance to rotations, so that a rotation of the input image will either leave the feature maps
unchanged or will rotate them accordingly. Most of the existing approaches fall into two categories:
the ones based on the rotation of the input images (Jaderberg et al., 2015; Dieleman et al., 2016;
Laptev et al., 2016; Henriques & Vedaldi, 2017; Esteves et al., 2018), and the ones based on con-
straints on the structure of the filters (Cohen & Welling, 2016; 2017; Worrall et al., 2017; Zhou et al.,
2017; Gonzalez et al., 2017; Li et al., 2017; Weiler et al., 2017).
We assess the robustness to adversarial examples of three distinct rotation-equivariant CNN archi-
tectures: Group Equivariant Convolutional Neural Networks (G-CNNs, Cohen & Welling (2016)),
Harmonic Networks (H-Nets, Worrall et al. (2017)), and Oriented Response Networks (ORNs, Zhou
et al. (2017)). First, G-CNNs provide equivariance to 90 degrees rotations and mirror reflections by
redefining the convolution operator over symmetry groups. Second, H-Nets obtain equivariance
to rotations of arbitrary angles using complex-valued filters constrained to the family of circular
harmonics. Finally, ORNs obtain invariance to rotations using filters that actively rotate during
convolution.
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All of these models have achieved (or defined a new) state-of-the-art performance on the rotated
MNIST dataset (MNIST-rot, Larochelle et al. (2007), while G-CNNs and ORNs have proven to
be competitive on the CIFAR-10 dataset (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) as well. All networks pro-
vide patch-wise rotation equivariance, thus might be more robust to local geometric transforma-
tions. Deep Rotation Equivariant Networks (Li et al., 2017) are also competitive on MNIST-rot and
CIFAR-10, but must be equivalent to G-CNNs with the group p4, up to differences in the proposed
architecture and learning procedure (Kondor & Trivedi, 2018). We present our experimental setup
in Section 2, our results in Section 3, and we conclude in Section 4.
2 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We train rotation-equivariant CNNs, as well as regular CNNs for comparison, on the MNIST,
CIFAR-10 and ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) datasets. We then evaluate those models against ad-
versarial examples generated from the corresponding datasets. In the case of MNIST, we consider
models with seven 5×5 convolutional layers, following the definition from Cohen & Welling (2016);
Worrall et al. (2017). We suppress as much as possible architecture-related specificities to compare
the models on equal grounds, and consider the same number of parameters of about 34k for all
models.
As for CIFAR-10, we consider a 44-layer residual network, ResNet-44, and its corresponding G-
CNN version which we call G-ResNet. We follow the exact same procedure as Cohen & Welling
(2016), and adjust the number of filters per layer in order to obtain the same number of parameters
for both models (2.6M). We were not able to achieve a competitive accuracy with H-Nets.
In the case of ImageNet, to the best of our knowledge only ORNs have public results. A pre-trained
residual model with 18 convolutional layers, OR-ResNet-18, was provided by the authors. We
compare its performances to the standard Torch implementation of ResNet-18. Both models have
a total of 1.4M parameters. For the training and validation of all networks, we have used publicly
available implementations.1
We consider recently proposed adversarial attacks based on geometric transformations. First, rigid
geometric transformations (global rotations and translations), following closely the procedure of
Engstrom et al. (2017), but considering a different range: translations of±3 pixels on both axes, and
rotation of ±10 degrees by step of one degree for all datasets. In the case of CIFAR-10, we have
compared zero and edge paddings, and found no significant difference. For ImageNet, we perform
rotation and translation of the 256× 256 images before cropping to 224× 224.
Next, we consider spatially transformed adversarial examples (stAdv, Xiao et al. (2018)), which are
white-box targeted attacks based on Spatial Transformer Networks (Jaderberg et al., 2015). The
generated adversarial examples are designed to be misclassified while keeping the spatial transfor-
mation distance low. To balance adversarial and flow losses, as defined in Xiao et al. (2018), we take
τ = 0.10. For each sample we generate a set of stAdv attacks, taking each possible wrong label as
a target. As there was no publicly available implementation of stAdv, we have implemented them in
TensorFlow.2
We also wanted to assess the robustness of rotation-equivariant networks to popular pixel-wise at-
tacks on the Lp norm. To that end, we considered the Fast Gradient Sign (Goodfellow et al., 2015)
and DeepFool (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017) attacks. They managed to completely fool the clas-
sifiers in almost all our cases, showing that there is no significant added robustness to these attacks
from rotation-equivariant architectures.
3 RESULTS
For every model and dataset, we report results on the single-crop error rate on the natural test set
(i.e., with no adversarial perturbation). The robustness to adversarial attacks is quantified with the
1 See tscohen/GrouPy, tscohen/gconv experiments (G-CNN),
deworrall92/harmonicConvolutions (H-Net), ZhouYanzhao/ORN (ORN), and
facebook/fb.resnet.torch (ResNet baseline on ImageNet) on GitHub.com.
2Our implementation is publicly available at rakutentech/stAdv on GitHub.com.
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Table 1: Error on the natural test set and attack success rate (ASR) on the MNIST (top), CIFAR-10
(bottom left), and ImageNet (bottom right) datasets. R+T indicates that the attacks are made from
a combination of rotations and translations, while R and T are for rotation- and translation-only
attacks, respectively. stAdv are spatially transformed adversarial attacks.
MNIST CNN H-Net G-CNN
Error 0.68% 0.69% 0.55%
ASR
R+T 6.2% 20.5% 3.4%
R 1.2% 4.8% 0.9%
T 2.6% 17.6% 1.4%
stAdv 92.6% 77.7% 80.1%
CIFAR-10 ResNet G-ResNet
Error 8.9% 6.1%
ASR
R+T 88.4% 70.1%
R 77.9% 52.1%
T 88.8% 66.5%
stAdv 83.4% 83.1%
ImageNet ResNet OR-ResNet
Error 30.6% 28.9%
ASR
R+T 6.8% 5.7%
R 6.5% 5.4%
T 3.4% 4.3%
attack success rate (ASR): the average fraction of attacks fooling a classifier, for a given type of
attack. In the computation of the ASR, we exclude samples from the test set which are misclassified
even if no perturbation is applied.
For the models trained on MNIST, we obtained a test error of less than 0.7% for all cases. The
results are shown in Table 1 (top). We find that H-Nets perform worse than the baseline on rotation-
based attacks, which is consistent with the observations of Li et al. (2017). However, they tend to
be more accurate under spatially transformed adversarial attacks, which could show that H-nets are
robust to local deformations due to their equivariance to local rotations of arbitrary angles. G-CNNs
are found to be more robust to rigid geometric transformations than the CNN baseline, which shows
that the learned representations are useful against this type of attack.
Second, on the CIFAR-10 dataset, we trained a ResNet-44 and obtained a test error of 8.9%, and
trained a rotation-equivariant G-ResNet and obtained a test error of 6.1%. Results are shown in
Table 1 (bottom left). All attacks are much more successful than on MNIST since CIFAR-10 im-
ages have a much richer content while having a comparable size. Overall, the G-ResNet achieves
far lesser vulnerability to attacks by rotation and translation than the regular ResNet, and is only
marginally better against the stAdv attacks. For pure rotations, we have a drop in the ASR of 33%.
Finally, on the larger ImageNet dataset, we used a pre-trained ResNet-18 (resp. OR-ResNet-18) that
achieves 30.6% error (resp. 28.9%) on the test set. Results are shown in Table 1 (bottom right).
We can see that ORNs bring an improvement against rotation attacks, and are slightly worse than a
regular ResNet with translation attacks. For combined rotations and translations, there is a drop in
the ASR of 19%. We only tested rotation and translation-based attacks and could not test the stAdv
attacks for the OR-ResNet given the absence of a Torch implementation for this kind of attack.
We also analyzed the distribution of the ASR for combined rotations and translations on the three
datasets. Results are shown in Fig. 1. In the case of MNIST, the CNN and G-CNN distributions are
smoothly falling and very similar to each other, while the one for H-Net exhibits a more complicated
structure with a secondary peak around ASR = 0.3. As for CIFAR-10, both ResNet and G-ResNet
produce clear bimodal distributions (less pronounced in the G-ResNet case). We have found that
all samples from the “bird” class have 0 < ASR < 0.2 for the regular ResNet, indicating that the
network has learned discriminative features which are nearly invariant to the considered transforma-
tions for this class alone. Finally, in the case of ImageNet, both distributions are smoothly falling
but at a much lower rate than for MNIST.
Finally, we checked the correlation coefficient ρ between the ASR and the absolute value of the
rotation angle. In the case of MNIST, all tested rotation-equivariant networks are less sensitive
to the rotation angle than the regular CNN, with (ρCNN, ρH−Net, ρG−CNN) = (0.28, 0.12, 0.18).
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Figure 1: Distributions of the attack success rate for combined rotations and translations on the test
set for MNIST (top left), CIFAR-10 (top right), and ImageNet (bottom).
Surprisingly, we observe the opposite behavior in the case of the residual networks we consider for
CIFAR-10 ((ρResNet, ρG−ResNet) = (0.07, 0.33)), while there is no significant difference for the
two models tested on ImageNet ((ρResNet, ρOR−ResNet) = (0.06, 0.05)).
4 CONCLUSIONS
The investigation of changes in the architecture of CNNs as a defense against adversarial examples
is a relatively unexplored area. In order to evaluate the robustness of rotation-equivariant networks
to adversarial examples, we conducted experiments on three different types of CNN architectures:
G-CNNs, H-Nets, and ORNs, on three different datasets: MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet. The
networks which are equivariant to rotations by discrete angles were found to be significantly more
robust to attacks based on small translations and rotations and, more marginally, to attacks based
on local geometric distortions. We hope that this work will serve as a motivation for further studies
on CNNs with extended symmetries, as well as for exploring the interplay between the natural
robustness of the rotation-equivariant architectures to geometric-based adversarial attacks and other
mechanisms of defense against adversarial examples.
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